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WILLs-ExEcUTION-Lacey et al. v. Dobb.-50 Atlantic Re-*

porter, 497. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. November 15, 1901.)-Perhaps no branch of the law from the
layman's point of view should in natural justice be more free
from doubt than that directing the formalities necessary to the
validity of a will, for although the right to divert property by
will out of the channel fixed by law to prevent its becoming
common again at the death of the owner may have had its origin
in a mere privilege of legislative enactment, yet to-clay, by
reason of long usage, this privilege has come to be looked upon
by the public as a natural right. However this may be, it must
be confessed that at the present time few branches of the law
are more fruitful of litigation. Beginning with the statute 9f
frauds (29 Car. II.) and continuing under later statutes down
to the present time, frequent cases have arisen concerning the
office or purpose of witnesses under each particular statute.
Such was the present case. The act of New Jersey upon which
358

NOTES.

the validity of all wills depends (3 Gen. St., p. 3760) provides
that "all wills and testaments . . . shall be in writing,
and shall be signed by the testator, which signature shall be made
by the testator or the making thereof acknowledged by him,
and such writing declared to be his last will, in the presence of
two witnesses present at the same time, who shall subscribe their
names thereto as witnesses, in the presence of the testator."
The question presented was whether under this statute it is
essential to the validity of the will that everything required to
be done by the testator should precede in point of time the subscription of the witnesses, it having been proved that the signature of the deceased to the paper writing produced, had been
made after the subscription of the putative testamentary witnesses, although on the same occasion and while they were still
present. The majority of the court after renouncing a dictum
in Mundy v. Mundy, 15 N. J. Eq. 290 (1858), to the effect that
the order of signing is not material to the validity of a- will,
came to the conclusion that it is the entire testamentary act,
including the testator's signature or acknowledgment of signature which the witnesses are to attest by their subscription, and
consequently that the former must precede the latter in point
of time.
As there was a strong dissent in the present case, it can be
imagined that the question is not one entirely free from doubt,
or one upon which the statntes of other jurisdictions have
received a unanimous interpretation. Before considering the law
as it stands under the statutes of the various states, it may perhaps be well to consider the decisions having any bearing upon
this subject which have arisen under the two great English
statutes, viz: the Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II., c. 3, § 5) and
the modern Wills Act (1 Viet., c. 26), because these acts have
served as models for the act concerning wills of nearly every
state of the Union. It follows that while the interpretation
placed upon them by the English courts is not binding upon
the courts of this country, yet (as said in the present case) "such
interpretation is highly persuasive."
The statute of frauds (29 Car. II., c. 3, § 5), which was the
first act to require witnesses to wills disposing of realty, provided that such devises "Shall be in writing and signed by the
party so devising the same, or by some other person in hid presence and by his express directions, and shall be attested and subscribed, in the presence of the said devisor, by three or four
credible witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void and of no
effect." It was not u.ntil'this act had been superseded by the
Victorian statute that the question presented in the present ease
ever arose in England. For this reason any attempt to define
the interpretation which the courts would have placed upon the
words "attest and subscribe" must be in its very nature purely
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conjectural; and it is for this reason that the decisions of states
whose statutes are modeled after the one in question differ;
those arising under statutes actually or professedly modeled after
the more explicit statute of Victoria being unanimous.
The first case arising trader the statute of frauds which throws
any light upon this question is that of Peate v. Ougly, Comyns,
197 (1710). The question presented was whether a codicil. to
the will there produced was well executed. The will itself was
written prior to the Stat. 29 Car. II. (1668-69).. Subsequent
to this statute the codicil in question was added, extending to
the foot of the paper, and when produced, had the name of the
devisor and his seal attached. At the top of the will was written,
"signed, sealed and published as my last will and testament,
in the presence of, the same being written here for want of room
below." Then followed the names of the witnesses. The only
surviving witness testified that when he and the other witnesses
signed, the paper was so folded that they could not see the
writing; neither did the deceased tell them it was his will; "but
he believes this to be the paper, because his name is there and
the names of the other witnesses, and he never witnessed any
other deed or paper for the earl. And though the earl did not
set his name and seal to the will in their presence, yet he had
often seen the earl write, and believes the whole will and codicil
to be in his handwriting."
On behalf of the contestants it was argued that "the execution
of the will (codicil) is not good within the statute 29 Car. II.,
for it is not sufficient that the witnesses write their names in
the presence of the testator without anything more, but they
must attest everything, viz: the signing of the testator, or at
least the publication of his will; but here the testator neither
signed the will in their presence, nor declared it to be his last
will before them."
In supporf of the will it was argued, that "the execution is
sufficient within the statute, for there is no necessity that the
witnesses see the testator write his name, and if he writes these
words, signed, seared and published as his will, and prays the
witnesses to subscribe their names to that, it will be a sufficient
publication of his- will though the witnesses do not hear him
declare it to be his will."
Trevor, C. J., "inclined that here was stfflcient evidence to
find the codicil well executed, and the jury found it accordingly?"
It will be noticed that the only question left to the jury was
whether the codicil was "well executed ;" in other words, whether
the testator's signature and seal had been affixed to the paper
at the time the witnesses signed, and the verdict can be justified
only upon the ground that the jury found such to have been
the case. Even the argument in support of the will implies such
a necessity; the two arguments differing only as to whether
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there had been a sufficient publication or expression of intent
on the part of the testator that the paper as a completed whole
should take effect as a will. However, this may be, the fact that
in this case the witnesses were unable to attest the due execution
of the will and were of service merely for purposes of identifying
the paper produced, has given rise to the doctrine which prevails
in several of the states (notably Kentucky and Virginia) that
the purpose of witnesses' subscriptions under statutes similar to
the statute of frauds is merely that of identification, and hence
it is immaterial whether their signatures precede or follow that
of the testator.
Another case bearing indirectly upon this subject is Wyndham
v. Ohetwynd, 1 Burrows, 414 (1757).
The question there
raised was whether a will of land attested by three interested
witnesses was duly attested by three credible witnesses within
Stat. 29. Car. II., c. 3. Lord Mansfield at p. 21 of the -report
uses this language: "Suppose the subscribing witnesses honest,
how little need they know? They do not know the contents;
they need not be together; they need not see the testator sign
(if be acknowledges his hand it is sufficient) ; they need not
know it to be a will (if he delivers it as a deed it is sufficient)."
This language seems to imply a signing by the testator before
the witnesses, but it also seems to imply that the purpose of the
witnesses is t6 identify the paper, not to attest its execution.
A third and last case is Roberts v. Phillips, 4 El. & Bl. 450,
which was decided as late as 1855. The will (which was executed in 1828 and was therefore governed by the statute of
frauds) was written on three sides, of a folded sheet of paper. On
the last was the signature of the testator and an attesting clause
subscribed by two witnesses. On the second page appeared the
name of a fourth person. The jury found that he signed as an
attesting witness at the same time as the others. The court held
that the will was duly attested. Lord Campbell, C. J., said,
"The mere requisition that the will shall be subscribed by the
witnesses, we think, is complied with, by the witnesses who saw
it executed by the testator immediately signing their names on
any part of it at his request with the intention of attesting it."
This last judicial construction of the statute of frauds clearly
assumes a signing by the testator before the witnesses. The
case, however, having arisen after the passage of the Statute 1
Vict. and after the rendition of several decisions thereunder to
the effect that the signature of the testator must precede those
of the witnesses, the langfiage above quoted should not be given
too much weight, for although Lord Campbell in his opinion
complains of the hardships caused by the new act, yet it is not
at all unlikely that in using the language above, he was strongly
influenced by the then established law as laid down in these
decisions.
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The general result of the cases under the statute of frauds
appears to be that while they all assume that the signature of the
testator has preceded the subscription of the witnesses, yet they
also assume that the only purpose of the witnesses is to attest
the writing itself for purTposes of identification when it is produced for probate, and not to attest the due execution including
signing by the testator. And it is to be observed that by the
wording of the statute itself, it is the declared written will and
not the testator's signature which is to be attested. Had the
present question arisen in England under this statute the result,
in View of the loose construction placed upon it, is exceedingly
doubtful.
To remove these doubts existing under the statute of frauds
and to bring testaments of personalty, which I) to this time
had been left to the ecclesiastical courts unaffected by legislation, into uniformity with devises of land, "An act for the
amendment of the laws with respect to wills" was passed by
Parliament in 1837 (1 Vict., c. 26). Section 9 of this act provides that "no will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing
and executed in manner hereinafter mentioned; that is to say,
it shall be signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator, or by
some other person in his presence and by his direction, and such
signature shall be made or acknowledged by the testator in the
presence of two or more witnesses present at the same time, and
such witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe the will in the
presence of the testator, but no form of attestation shall be
necessary."
A case identical to the one here in discussion arose under this
act in 1841 (In the goods of Olding, 2 Curt. Ecc. 865) ex parte
upon motion for probate of a will which had been signed by the
testator after the witnesses had subscribed their names. Motion
for probate was denied, no opinion being delivered. The same
question was presented the next year (1842) in Goods of Byrd,
3 CuTt. Ecc. 117. This case differed from the prior one only in
the fact that after the signing by the deceased, the witnesses had
placed seals opposite their nanites. Sir Herbert Jenner Fust said
that he saw no real -distinction between this case and In re Olding. "My opinion is," he said, "that the witnesses should subscribe the will after the testator has signed it." Motion for
probate was rejected.
In Moore v. King, 3 Curt. Ecc. 243 (1842), the same judge
in holding invalid a will in which one witness had signed after
the testator, but upon a subsequent day had acknowledged his
signature in the presence of a second witness who then signed,
said, "I am inclined to think that the act is not complied with,
unless both witnesses shall attest and subscribe after the testator's signature shall have been made and acknowledged to them
when both are actually present at the same time.'
And in
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Cooper v. Boclett, 3 Curt. Ece. 648 (1843), although the evidence was held sufficient to establish the fact that the testator
had signed before the witnesses, yet the coLtt expressly said
that the requirements of the act would not be complied with if
the court were to hold "that a testator might sign, after the
witnesses had subscribed, either at the same time, or two hours,
or two weeks afterwards." The state of facts presented in
Peate v. Ougly arose under this statute in Ilatt v. Genge, 3
Curt. Eec. 160 (1842), and also in Hudson v. Parker, 1 Rob.
Ece. 14 (1844), and in both cases the will was held invalid.
These cases, together with Charltonv. ffindmarsh, 1 Swab. & T.
433, and the same ease affirmed in 8 H. L. C. 160, have settled
once for all that under this statute it is the making or acknowledging of the testator's signature which the witnesses are to
attest by subscription, and consequently such signature must of
necessity precede those of the witnesses.
The American .cases involving a decision of this question,
which have arisen under -statutes similar to the statute of
frauds, viz: those statutes not in terms requiring a testator's
signature, but only his declared written will, to be attested,
divide themselves into two groups:
1. Those holding that there can be attestation before signature
of testator.
2. Those holding that there cannot.
It is submitted that in all cases falling under (1) the subscriptions by the witnesses and signature by the testator formed
substantially one transaction, no,American case having apparently gone so far as to hold a will valid where the subscriptions
by the witnesses and subsequent signing by the testator were
separate and disconnected acts.
Probably the first American decision on this subject is that
presented in Swift v. Wiley, 1 B. Mon. (Ky.) 114 (1840). The
then existing Kentucky statute. under which it was decided
(Stat. f797, Stat. Laws 1537-38) provided that last wills and
testaments devising real estate shall*"be signed by the testator
or testatrix, or by some other person in his or her presence, and
by his or her direction, and moreover, if not wholly written by
himself or herself, be attested by two or more competent witnesses, subscribing their names in his or her presence." The
controverted paper in this case was written by a third person,
but was read to the testator, who thereupon approved its contents. Two witnesses then present subscribed their names as
witnesses. Some hours later the testator subscribed his name in
the presence of the two witnesses, "who still remaining with
him, again acknowledged their respective signatures as subscribing witnesses." The physician who was present at this time
also signed as a third witness. The will was held valid, the
court resting its decision upon the distinction which they drew
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between "attestation" and "subscription." They said, 'o attest
a will is to know that it was published as such, and to
certify the facts required to constitute an actual and legal publication: but to subscribe a paper published as a will, is only
to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for the
sole purpose of identification. There may be a perfect attestation in fact without subscription. But to insure identity and
prevent the fraudulent substitution of any other document than
that which has been published and attested, the statute provideutly requires the attesting witnesses to subscribe their names
in the presence of the testator: but it does not prescribe the
order of the attestation and the subscription; and the attestation
being intended to prove that a will had been published, but the
subscription being required only to identify the document which
had been attested as a will, whether the one or the other of these
acts shall have been first in time, cannot be essential to the
objects of the statute or the effect of the publication; nor can
it be material whether the names of the attesting witnesses or
that of the testator shall have been first subscribed, if, as in this
-case, those witnesses had been present when the testator either
wrote his name or acknowledged it as his signature, and, beinr
called on for that purpose, actually witnessed or attested that
fact." The language above quoted is evidently based upon a
misconception of the meaning of the word "attest," which,
according to the best authorities, means to subscribe as a wifness. lNevertheless this same case (Swift v. Wiley) was
approved in the later case of Uplhurch v. Upchurch, 16 B. Mon.
102 (1855), as laying down the proper distinction between subscription and attestation; and hence where the signatures of
the witnesses were made by another, these were held sufficient
under the statlite, since the witnesses- recognized the paper as
the one which they "attested"--in the mental sense. Judge
Gray, in the Massachusetts case of Chase v. Kittredge, 11 Allen,
49 (1865), draws the same distinction between "subscription"
and "attestation," but reaches. a different result on the ground
that the witnesses are to subscribe "in proof of' their attestation.
In the light of later decisions Swift v. Wiley can be best justified on the following grounds, which were apparently added as
a mere make-weight: "Were it material," says Robertson, C. J.,
"we might, with obvious truth and propriety, consider the subscription of the names of the three attesting witnesses and of
that of the testator, as. one continuous series of acts, essentially
indivisible as to time, the two first witnesses having remained
with the testator until they had, in fact, attested his subscription
and that of the third witness, and all being present attesting,
altogether, the final act of publication, and of attestation and
subscription as to each and all." Here we see the first appearance of the "same transaction" doctrine upon which all the
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later cases justify the subscribing by the witnesses before the
testator. The next Kentucky case, Sechrest v. Edwards, 4 Metc.
(Ky.) 163 (1862) (as also Upchurch v. Upchurch ubi supra),
arose under the Revised Statutes, Sec. 5, chap. 106, which provided in part that if the will be not "wholly written by the
testator, the subscription shall be made, or the will acknowledged,
by him, in the presence of at least two credible witnesses, who
shall subscribe the will with their names in the presence of the
testator." It will be noticed that the word "attest" does not
appear. The court, however, held this provision to be a substantial re-enactment of the act of 1797, and said that under it (as
held in Swift v. Wiley under the prior statute) it is not material
whether the names of the attesting witnesses, or that of the
testator, shall have been flrst subscribed, if the witnesses be
present when the testator writes his name, or acknowledges his
signature, and being called on for that purpose actually witnessed or attested that fact.
It is a significant fact that the court in basing this decision
upon Swift v. Wiley, held that case to have been decided rather
upon the circumstance that the witnesses still remained present
when the testator -igned or, acknowledged his signature, than
upon the distinction between "attestation" and "subscription."
In giving the restilt of the prior decision, it will be noticed that
they use these words as synonymous. This was probably a
necessary result brought about by the omission of the word
"attest" from the later statute. The case seems to show a drifting away by the Kentucky courts from the distinction between
in Swift v. Wiley and an adoption of
these words as laid downtheory.I
the "same transaction"
Nine years after the decision of Swift v. Wiley (1849) a case
very much the same arose in Virginia under a similar statute.
Rosser v. Franklin, 6 Grat. 1. Briefly stated the facts were
these: The will in question and also the signature of the testatrix were written by one of the witnesses. At the time the
witnesses signed, she acknowledged it to be her will. Subsequently to their signing she affixed her mark. The court held
the will to be valid, saying that "It is not necessary that the
subscribing witnesses to a will shod see the testator sign, or
that he should acknowledge to them the subscription of his name
to be his signature, or even that the instrument is his will. It
is enough that he should acknowledge in their presence that the
act was his, with a knowledge of the contents of the instrument, and the design that it should be the testamentary disposition of his property." The affixing 6f the mark, the court said,
.was apparently an afterthought, and in this aspect "it was a
work of supererogation." But continuing, the court used this
language: "And, moreover, the fact whether in the order of
time the testatrix made her mark before or after the subscription
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of the witnesses is, rider the circumstances, in no wise material,
insomuch as the whoTe transaction must be regarded as one
continuous uninterrupted act, conducted and completed within
a few minutes, while all concerned in it continued present, and
during the unbroken supervising attesting attention of the subscribing witnesses." As an authority involving this "same transaction" doctrine the case is stronger than Swift v. Wiley, for
while the Kentucky case was practically decided upon another
ground, yet in the present case, ulion the contingency that the
making of the work was not a mere afterthought, this doctrine must constitute the entire basis of the decision. And in
Sthrdivant v. Birchett, 10 Grat. 67 (1853) the same court carried this doctrine so far as to hold that where the witnesses had
signed in another room but had immediately thereafter acknowledged their signatures to the testator, this was a substantial
subscribing of their names in the presence of the testator. The
next case involving this doctrine to arise in chronological order
was O'Brien v. Galagher, 25 Conn. 229 (1856). The Connecticut statute closely follows the wording of the statute of frauds,
there being, however, the additional requirement that the witnesses shall subscribe in the presence of each other. Under it
the court held the will valid where the witnesses signed before
the testator, the latter, however, immediately thereafter affixing
his signature. In the course of their opinion the court said;
"The general and regular course undoubtedly is for the testator,
in the first place, to sign and execute the will on his part, and
then to call upon the witnesses to attest the execution by subscribing their names. But where as in the present case witnesses are called to attest the execution of a will; and being
informed what the instrument is, subscribe, their names thereto
as witnesses, and the testator on his part and in their presence
duly executes the instrument as his will, and all is done at one
and the same time, and for the purpose of perfecting the instrument as a will, we cannot say that it is not legally executed
merely because the names of the witnesses were subscribed before
that of the testator!'
This case was followed four years later in Pennsylvania by
Miller v. McNeill, 35 Pa. 217 (1860). The facts were these:
The testator and the subscribing witnesses to his will were
assembled around the same table at the same time. All signed
a will in the presence of each other, but the subscribing witnesses
wrote their names before the testator wrote his. The Pennsylvania statute (P. L. 1832-33, p. 249, § 6) provides that "every
will shall be in writing, and unless the person making the same
shall be prevented by the extremity of his last sickness, shall be
signed by him at the end thereof, or by some person in his presence, and by his express direction, and in all cases shall be
proved by the oaths or affirmations of two or more competent
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witnesses; and otherwise shall be of no effect." Under ithis
statute the will was held valid. Woodward, J., in the course
of a short opinion said, "Our statute contemplates, undoubtedly,
a signature by the testator, and then a signing by witnesses in
attestation of that signature, when witnesses subscribe at all;
but where a transaction consists of several parts, all of Which
occur at the same moment, and in the same presence, are we
required to undo it because they did not occur. in the orderly
succession which the law contemplates? . . . The execution and attestation of the will were contemporaneous, or rather
simultaneous acts, and we will not regard the question, who
held the pen first-the testator or his witnesses." Although
the strength of this decision is somewhat weakened by the fact
that under this act subscribing witnesses are not necessary (Carson's Appeal, 59 Pa. 493, 1868; Frew v. Clarke, 80 Pa. 170,
1875), nevertheless, it stands as the law in Pennsylvania in
cases where the witnesses do actually subscribe.
The latest case, and the one in which this view has received
its most comprehensive treatment, is Kaufman v. Caughman,
49 S. C. 159 (1896). Section 1988, Revised Statutes of that
state, provides that "all wills and testaments of real and personal
property shall be in writing, and signed by the party executing
the same, or by so"me other person in his presence, and by his
express directions, and shall be attested and subscribed, in the
presence of the said testator and of each other, by three or more
credible witnesses, or else they shall be utterly void and of none
effect." In the present case the testator signed after the witnesses in point of time, but upon the same occasion. The court
held the will valid, saying that under this statute (as differing
from the statute 1 Viet.) it is not merely the signature of the
testator which the witnesses attest, "but they attest the will,
which is not merely the paper containing a declaration of the
testator's mind or will, but includes all the statutory requirements essential to constitute the writing a will." Continuing
the coLTt said, "If it be asked, as Sir Herbert Jenner Tust asked
in 2 Curt. 865, 'Is the paper a will before it is signed by the
testator?' or if it be asked, can witnesses attest before it is
made? the answer is, the testator's signature does not make the
will, and that there is no will until testator and witnesses have
all signed. In acts substantially contemporaneous, it cannot be
said that there is any substantial priority." The case of Chase
v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 49, was distinguished on the ground that
in that case the witnesses signed before the testator and in his
absence, and hence their signing and that of the testator were
-not substantially contemporaneous acts.
From these authorities it will be seen that even those states
which allow a signing by the witnesses before the testator, do
so only upon the assumption that the two have been substantially
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contemporaneous acts so as to make them both parts of the same
transaction. It may be mentioned that while the exact case
here in question has never arisen in Maryland, yet this doctrine
appears to be recognized in that state. Moale v. Cutting, 59 Md.
510 (1882).
2. Examining next those cases arising under statutes similar
to the statute of frauds in which the courts have refused to hold
valid a will in which the signing by the witnesses has preceded
the signing by the testator, the earliest case in point of time is
Ragland v. Huntingdon, 1 Ired. (N. C.) 561 (1841). The
North Carolina statute (Rev. St., c. 122, § 1) providedthat a
will or testament in order to be sufficient to convey an estate
in lands. must be subscribed in the presence of the testator by
two witnesses at least. In this case the will was written the
night before by one of the witnesses who subscribed his name
as such. The next day the testator signed his name in the
presence of the one who wrote the will, and another who immediately thereafter signed. In a short opinion, the court held the
will invalid because it was not subscribed by two witnesses in the
presence of the testator. This case was followed in North Carolina a few years later by In re Cox's Will, 1 Jones, 321 (1854),
with facts substantially identical. Relying upon the prior case,
the court held that "the witness must, in fact, subscribe his
name in the presence of the testator. The act is necessary. No
words will answer the purpose." The court in giving this
latter decision was apparently influenced to a great extent by
the English decisions under the statute of Victoria, which it
pronounced similar to that of North Carolina. This seems to
have been an erroneous view. These two decisions -while
authority for the fact that statutes requiring subscription in the
presence of the testator are to be strictly construed, are no.
authority for the case in which there has been a subscription in
fact in the presence of the testator, but preceding his in point
of time.
A case in which the witnesses signed in the presence of the
testator, but one of them several months prior to the signing
by the testator, and who was absent when the testator and the
second witness signed, arose in Indiana in 1867 in the case of
Reed v. Watson, 27 Ind. 443, under a statute pronounced by the
court to be similar to the fifth section of Statute 29 Car. II., 2 G.
& H. 555. Upon these facts the will was held invalid. In the
opinion, the same distinction was made between attestation and
subscription as in the Kentucky cases, the court saying, "To
attest is one thing, to subscribe is another."
The statute was
construed to mean that the witnesses to the will are to "attest,
that is witness, its publication or execution by the testator."
The decision was based entirely upon the fact that the first witness being absent when the testator signed, had not "attested"

.
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in the sense here laid down, the execution of the will, viz: the
signing by the testator. The court said, "The authorities, we
think, all concur, that, to constitute a valid attestation of a will,
the testator must either sign in the presence of the subscribing
witnesses, or acknowledge his signature to them. Here, as we
have seen, the testator did not sign the will in the presence of
Marsh, one of the subscribing witnesses, and it does not appear
that Marsh ever saw the will after it was signed by Reed (the
testator) or knew that it was so signed.' This language and
the fact that Swift v. Wiley and O'Brien v. Gallagher were cited
with approval rather shows that the decision would have been
otherwise had the first witness been present when the testator
and the second witness signed.
In 1869 a case arose in Georgia (Duffle v. Corridon, 40 Ga.
122) in which the witnesses signed in the presence of the testatrix, but through oversight she neglected then to sign. The
next day the testatrix signed in the presence of two of the
former witnesses and of a third, who then subscribed his name;
the two original witnesses acknowledging their signatures. The
court adopted practically the same view as that expressed by
Justice Gray four years previously in Chase v. Kittredge, 11
Allen (Mass.) 49, and held that it is the signature of the testator tat is to be attested, and that as subscription is in evidence of attestation, it must necessarily precede. It will be
observed that while the reasoning in this case is broad enough
to cover one in which the previois signing by the witnesses and
the subsequent signing by the testator are so closely connected
in point of time as to be each part of one and the same transaction, still upon its facts it is no authority for such case. This
case. however, did arise in Georgia in 1891, Brooks v. Woodson,
87 Ga. 372. In their opinion the court held the principle laid
down in the prior case in their state correct, and hence the fact
that the acts were all parts of the same transaction immaterial.
"To witness a future event," said the court, "is equally impossible, whether it occur the next moment or the next week."
In the Massachusetts case above -eferred to in which this
doctrine was first laid down, Chase v. Kittredge, 11 Allen, 49,
the signahtre of one of the witnesses was made prior to that
of the testator and in his absence, being subsequently acknowledged when the testator and the other witnesses signed. The
ease might therefore have been decided solely upon the ground
that there had not been a sufficient compliance with the statLte
requiring that the will shall be "attested and subscribed in the
presence of the testator"
Judge Gray went further, however, and after making the
same distinction between attestation and subscription as was
first made in the Kentucky cases, held that it is the completed
will which is to -be attested, and that the subscription being in

NOTES.

evidence of the previous attestation, it must necessarily follow
the signing of the testator. In the course of his opinion he
said, "The subscription is the evidence of their previous attestation, and to preserve the proof of that attestation in case of their
death or absence when after the testator's death the will shall be
presented for probate. It is as difficult to see how they can
subscribe in proof of their attestation before they have attested,
as it is to see how they can attest before the signature of the
testator has made it his written will." Although'this case was
nct one in which the facts constituted one transaction as nearly
as could be in the order of events, such case did arise in Massachusetts as late as 1900-Marshallv. Mason, 176 Mass. 216. In
this case the witnesses signed first in the presence of the testatrix, she signing immediately afterwards in their presence.
Holmes, C. J., without going into the question held the reasoning of JUstice Gray in-the previous case broad enough to, cover
this state of facts, and the will consequently invalid.
The preceding cases are apparently the only ones in--which
this question has been directly presented under statutes similar
to 29 Car. II. In Fowler v..Stagner, 55 Tex. 393 (1881),
although the exact point was not in issue, the case being similar
to Roberts v. Phillips (supra), the court used this language,
"It was not material, we think, in what part of the. instrument
they signed their names as witnesses, if that were done after the
subscription and acknowledgment of it by.the -testator, and with
the purpose of attesting it as subscribing witnesses." This would
apparently show that, should, the case arise in Texas, the court
would require a signing by the testator before that 6f-,the witnesses.
As a general-'esult of the cases arising. under statutes similar
to 'he fifth section of the statute of frauds, three propositions
may be laid down:
1. The statte requiring a subscribing, "in the presence of the
testator, such subscribing must be in -fact in his presence.
2. Where the will is subscribed by the witnesses in the presence of the testator, but is not signed by him until a subsequent
time, whether the. witnesses be then present or not, the will is
invalid.
3. Where the prior subscribing by the witnesses and the subsequent signing by the testator are so closely connected in point
of time as to constitute but parts of the same transaction, the
authorities differ according to the meaning given "attestation"
and the purposes ascribed to "subscription," the latter holding
that dven in such case the signature of the testator must precede the subscribing by the witnesses.
Few cases of this nature have been presented to the courts
under statutes similar to § 9 of 1 Viet., c. 26, viz: those statutes
in terms requiring the signature of the testator, not merely his
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declared written will, to be attested. This is probably because
the statutes concerning wills of the majority of the states follow the older English statute. A statute falling under this head,
though passed seven years prior to the Victorian statute, is that
of New York, which provides as follows: "Every last will and
testament of real or personal property, or both, shall be execluted
and attested in the following manner: (1) It shall be subscribed by the testator at the end of the will. (2) Such subscription shall be made by the testator, in the presence of each of
the attesting witnesses, or shall be acknowledged, by him, to
have been so made to each of the attesting witnesses. (3) The
testator at the time of making such subscription, or at the time
of acknowledging the same, shall declare the instrument, so
subscribed, to be his last will and testament; and (4) there shall
be at least two attesting witnesses, each of whom shall sign his
name as a witness at the end of the will at the
request of the testator."
2 Rev. St., p. 63, § 40.
In Ruddon v. McDonald, 1 Bradf. 352 (1850), it was
held that this statute prescribes all the formalities necessary to the valid execution of a will. The question still
remained as to the order in which they should be performed. The first case requiring a decision of this question was
Vaughan v. Burford; 3 Bradf. 78 (1854), in which the will had
been signed by the witnesses before the testator but L-pon the
same occasion. Surrogate Bradfield held the will to have been
properly executed under the statute, and admitted it to probate,
justifying his decision in the following words: "The particular
order of the several requisites to the valid execution of a testament is not at all material provided they are done at the same
time, that is, as part of the same transaction." This decision
stood as the true interpretation of the statute until 1868, when
a case involving similar facts was presented to the Court of
Appeals. (Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153.) That tribunal,
reversing the decree of the Supreme Court, which had affirmed
the Surrogate, held such will invalid tinder this statute, between
which and the statute of 1 Victoria there was said to be no
material difference. In the course of his opinion, Woodruff, J.,
pointed out that as the witnesses are to attest the signing by the
testator, if they sign before, "'for some period, longer or shorter,
as the case may be, those signatures attest no execution; they
certify what is not true ;" and that if while the will is in this
condition, the testator should sign in their absence, the presumption of due execution upon.the death or absence of the witnesses
would be destroyed. Continuing, he negatived any idea that
under such statute the one transaction doctrine could have any
place, because the statute in terms requires the attestation of a
past transaction, and any relaxation of this rule would be open
to danger and abuse. This case was followed in Sisters of
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Charity v. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 409 (1876), so that the law in this
respect under the New York statute seems to be perfectly well
settled.
The only other case involving this question which has arisen
under a statute similar to that of 1 Victoria appears to be the
one here in discussion. Considering the interpretation placed
upon their statute by the English courts and also those of New
York, and the arguments advanced in support of the same, the
decision of the majority of the court in the present case seems
to be justified both upon principle and authority.
Besides those states having statutes the wording of which follows closely that of either of the English acts, there are some
whose statutes are in terms unique. In these states a decision of
a case involving facts of this nature must depend entirely upon
a judicial determination of the meaning of the particular act
in question unaided by previous authority. Such a statute is
that of Illinois, which received its first interpretation in Hobart
v. Hobart, 154 ill. 610, where it was held that it is the will
which is to be attested, and not the signing by the testator. This
case was followed by Gibson v. Nelson, 181 Ill. i22, which held
that the order of signing is immaterial, although there was a
dictum in the case to the effect that the decision would have
been otherwise had not all occurred upon the same occasion.,
The general result of the cases appears to be -hat-whether
the statute in question follows 29 Car. II. or 1. Viet, by the
weight of recent authority -the signing. by the testator must in
point of time precede that of the witnesses. In some states an
exception is made to this rule and the ivill held valid where
the prior signing by the witnesses and the subsequent signing by
the testator all occurred rq~on the same ocaasion so as to, be
merely parts of one transaction, but this exception seems to have
no place under statutes following that of 1 Victoria, but to be
confined to those in terms similar to'29 Car. II. Under statutes in terms following neither of the English acts, the courts
in deciding this question must determine whether it is merely
the will, or the signing by the testator, which is to be attested
by the witnesses. If the former, then the one transaction doctrine may or may" not be applied; if the latter, then the signing
by the testator must precede that of the witnesses irrespective
of this fact.
D.H.Y.

